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HOW LIABILITY INSURERS PROTECT PATIENTS
AND IMPROVE SAFETY
Tom Baker* and Charles Silver**
INTRODUCTION
Forty years after the publication of the first systematic study of ad-
verse medical events,1 the patient safety world has changed. Among
other developments, there is greater access to information about ad-
verse medical events and increasingly widespread acceptance of the
view that patient safety requires more than vigilance by well-inten-
tioned medical professionals. In this Article, we describe some of the
ways that medical liability insurance organizations contributed to this
transformation, and we catalog the roles that those organizations play
in promoting patient safety today.
While we will not explore in any detail the tort liability regime that
provides the raison d’eˆtre for medical liability insurance, it is impor-
tant to emphasize that medical liability insurers exist, and therefore do
everything that they do, only because injured patients have the right
to legal recourse. Moreover, we know what we know about the land-
scape of adverse medical events largely because of medical malprac-
tice claims. This is obviously the case for the many important studies
that use insurance company closed claim files as the data source.
However, people often forget that the most important, large-scale,
hospital-based studies of adverse medical events had their origins in
efforts by the medical profession to prove there was a better way to
address patient injuries than tort litigation.2 While the studies failed to
* William Maul Measey Professor of Law and Health Sciences, University of Pennsylvania
Law School, http://ssrn.com/author=172195. Harold Bressler and Allison Hoffman provided val-
uable comments on a draft of this article at the 24th Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law
and Social Policy. Thank you to Kayla Katz and Joseph Noel for research assistance.
** Roy W. and Eugenia C. McDonald Endowed Chair in Civil Procedure, The University of
Texas at Austin School of Law, http://ssrn.com/author=164490.
1. See generally Don Harper Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study: A Technical Summary,
128 W. J. MED. 360 (1978) [hereinafter Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study] (summarizing
how adverse medical events affect patients).
2. See generally TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 94 (2005) [hereinafter
BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH]; CAL. MED. ASS’N & CAL. HOSP. ASS’N, REPORT
ON THE MEDICAL INSURANCE FEASIBILITY STUDY (Don Harper Mills ed., 1977); PATRICIA M.
DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1985) (relying in
209
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achieve that goal, they did achieve something important: documenting
that serious adverse medical events are a major public health
problem.3
Of course, medical liability insurers know that most patients who
bring medical malpractice claims have suffered significant injuries and
that many of those claims meet the legal standard for tort liability.4
They also know that many of those injuries are preventable and that
hospitals and other places where patients receive care still have room
for improvement.5 Thus, it is hardly surprising that medical liability
insurance organizations have been and remain at the forefront of ef-
forts to promote patient safety. Insurers undoubtedly undertake these
efforts primarily to improve their internal operations and profitability,
but these efforts also support the patient safety movement in health
care, as we describe and document in this Article.
Consistent with medical liability insurers’ focus on patient claiming,
we begin by discussing how insurers protect patients by providing
compensation that helps insurers deal with the consequences of medi-
cal mistakes. We then place insurers’ efforts to improve patient safety
more directly within the broader context of insurance as a form of
large part on Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study, supra note 1); Troyen A. Brennan et al.,
Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of The Harvard
Medical Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370 (1991) [hereinafter Brennan et al., Harvard
Medical Practice Study]. For a summary of closed claim studies as of 2005, see BAKER, THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH, supra, at 77–83. For more recent closed claim studies, see, for
example, Allen Kachalia et al., Missed and Delayed Diagnoses in The Emergency Department: A
Study of Closed Malpractice Claims From 4 Liability Insurers, 49 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED.
196 (2007); Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Using Malpractice Claims to Identify Risk Factors for
Neurological Impairments Among Infants Following Non-Reassuring Fetal Heart Rate Patterns
During Labour, 16 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 476 (2010); Eric G. Poon et al., Cognitive
Errors and Logistical Breakdowns Contributing to Missed and Delayed Diagnoses of Breast and
Colorectal Cancers: A Process Analysis of Closed Malpractice Claims, 27 J. GEN. INTERNAL
MED. 1416 (2012); Scott E. Regenbogen et al., Patterns of Technical Error Among Surgical Mal-
practice Claims: An Analysis of Strategies to Prevent Injury to Surgical Patients, 246 ANNALS
SURGERY 705 (2007); Hardeep Singh et al., Medical Errors Involving Trainees: A Study of Closed
Malpractice Claims From 5 Insurers, 167 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2030 (2007).
3. See generally INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) (relying in large part on Brennan et al., Harvard Medical Prac-
tice Study, supra note 2, and the closed claim studies). On the unsuccessful efforts of some of the
Harvard Medical Practice Study researchers to suggest that medical malpractice litigation was a
similarly serious problem, see generally Tom Baker, Reconsidering the Harvard Medical Practice
Study Conclusions About the Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 J. LAW, MED. & ETHICS
501 (2005).
4. See, e.g., BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH, supra note 2, at 77–83; Kachalia et
al., supra note 2; Kesselheim et al., supra note 2; Poon et al., supra note 2; Regenbogen et al.,
supra note 2; Singh et al., supra note 2.
5. See BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH, supra note 2, at 31–33 (explaining that an
Australian health care study found that “half of the medical management injuries were
preventable”).
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private governance. By doing so, we link this Article to prior work
growing out of two scholarly traditions: the law and economics schol-
arship that took hold in U.S. law schools in the early 1980s and a con-
temporaneous sociological tradition that entered into legal scholarship
through the Law and Society Association. We cannot provide the full
genealogy of this “insurance as governance” research in this Article.
Our goal here is to strengthen our qualitative account of the role of
medical liability insurers in promoting patient safety by providing a
theoretical grounding and links to research documenting similar gov-
ernance activities by insurers in other fields.
As we discuss, medical malpractice insurers promote patient safety
in at least six ways: (1) Insurers identify subpar providers in ways that
provide the opportunity for other institutions to act. (2) Insurers pro-
vide incentives for providers by charging premiums that are based on
risk and by refusing to insure providers who are too high-risk. (3) In-
surers accumulate data for root cause analysis. (4) Insurers conduct
loss prevention inspections of medical facilities. (5) Insurers educate
providers about legal oversight and steps that they can take to manage
their risks. (6) Finally, insurers provide financial and human capital
support to patient safety organizations.
I. LIABILITY INSURERS COMPENSATE VICTIMS FOR INJURIES
ATTRIBUTABLE TO MALPRACTICE
Liability insurers protect patients from the consequences of adverse
events by compensating them for the losses they sustain. Broadly
speaking, these losses come in two forms: (1) financial costs, which
may be attributable to need for additional medical treatments, lost
income, or other expenses; and (2) debilitation, which may include
ongoing pain, physical disfigurement, and psychological impairment.
Researchers have studied the medical malpractice liability system
many times, and many aspects of the system are well understood. For
example, it is known that, with occasional exceptions, patients must
sue to obtain recoveries, and to sue successfully they must hire attor-
neys. Because malpractice cases are expensive to prepare and are de-
fended zealously by insurers, plaintiffs’ attorneys choose cases with
care. Typically, they only accept clients with meritorious claims whose
injuries are sufficiently severe to generate sizeable recoveries. The ra-
tio of rejections to acceptances is high.
Even so, plaintiffs’ attorneys often drop malpractice cases after ac-
cepting them because evidence acquired during discovery frequently
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reveals hidden weaknesses.6 This pattern of high drop rates despite
careful initial assessments likely reflects the underlying distribution of
potential cases, in which weak cases (i.e., those in which adverse out-
comes occur as a result of natural causes) greatly outnumber strong
ones (i.e., those in which medical negligence is the cause). For exam-
ple, suppose the following: Among patients who experience bad out-
comes, the ratio of weak cases to strong ones is 9–1; a lawyer
evaluates 100 cases selected at random; and the lawyer sorts the cases
accurately 90% of the time. The group of potential cases will then
include 90 weak cases and 10 strong cases. The lawyer will correctly
reject 81 of the 90 weak cases, and the lawyer will incorrectly reject 1
of the 10 strong cases. The group of accepted cases will then include 9
strong cases and 9 weak ones—a 50-to-50 distribution. Despite the
lawyer’s highly accurate evaluation process, the skew in the underly-
ing distribution makes it seem as though the lawyer is as willing to
accept weak cases as strong ones.7
As the accepted cases proceed through discovery, many are
dropped while others are dismissed on motions or settled.8 Cases with
weak merits are more likely to be dismissed, to be dismissed quickly,
and to be dismissed with less expense than others.9 The time from
filing to disposition appears to be influenced by insurers’ subjective
assessments of claim strength. Insurers dispute claims until they are
convinced of their merit, at which point they settle.10
Settlements occur before trials, after trials, and often during the ap-
peal process. Regardless of the stage of resolution, empirical studies
have shown that the payments patients receive, when they do receive
them, conform to certain patterns. First, when the providers are inde-
pendently-employed physicians, insurers provide all but a minute frac-
tion of the dollars that are paid.11 Second, payments rarely exceed
primary carriers’ policy limits, even when jury verdicts establish that
6. See generally Paul Fenn & Neil Rickman, Information and the Disposition of Medical Mal-
practice Claims: A Competing Risks Analysis, 30 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 244 (2014).
7. This analysis is drawn from Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About The
Behavior of The Tort Litigation System—and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
8. See Fenn & Rickman, supra note 6.
9. See generally David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024 (2006) [hereinafter Studdert et al.,
Claims, Errors, and Compensation].
10. On the connection between information about claim quality, claim managers’ assessments,
and settlement, see Fenn & Rickman, supra note 6.
11. See Kathryn Zeiler et al., Physicians’ Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evi-
dence from Texas Closed Claims, 1990–2003, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. (Vol. Supp.) S9, S11 (2007)
(“[T]his study finds that physicians rarely used personal assets to resolve malpractice claims.”).
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the legal value of plaintiffs’ claims is far higher.12 Third, trial verdicts
and settlement payments grow in size as injuries become more severe
and the strength of the evidence of malpractice increases.13 Fourth, a
“death discount” exists, meaning that payments tend to be larger
when patients sustain grave, permanent injuries than when they die.14
Fifth, the most serious and persistent defect in the tort system more
broadly—other than litigation costs—is the tendency to under-com-
pensate victims with meritorious claims.15 Juries often send deserving
plaintiffs home empty-handed, and severely injured plaintiffs fre-
quently receive smaller payments than they deserve. The more griev-
ous the injury, the more likely and more serious the problem of under-
compensation tends to be.
Liability insurance matters from beginning to end, that is, from case
selection to the conclusion of litigation. Even when injuries are large
and the facts strongly indicate that negligence occurred, plaintiffs’ at-
torneys often decline requests for representation when providers carry
little or no malpractice coverage. In the main, plaintiffs’ attorneys are
in the business of collecting from insurers; only in exceptional cases do
they go after doctors’ personal assets. An empirical study of Texas
found that patients suffered compensation shortfalls because the prov-
iders who treated them carried less insurance than needed to compen-
sate them in full.16 Because Texas has strong debtor-protection laws,
settlements above the policy limits that involve payments from physi-
cians are uncommon.17 For the same reason, Texas settlements may be
smaller than those in other states, where the law gives tort claimants
better access to providers’ personal assets.18
As a rough generalization, it is usually true that patients’ recoveries
in medical malpractice top out at the limits of doctors’ professional
12. See generally Tom Baker et al., Everything’s Bigger in Texas: Except the Medmal Settle-
ments, 22 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2016) [hereinafter Baker et al., Everything’s Bigger in Texas]; David
A. Hyman et al., Do Defendants Pay What Juries Award? Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas Medical
Malpractice Cases, 1988–2003, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3 (2007); Charles Silver et al., Policy
Limits, Payouts, and Blood Money: Medical Malpractice Settlements in the Shadow of Insurance,
5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 559 (2015).
13. For a discussion on trial verdicts, see THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BU-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 203098, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN
LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, at 2 (2004) (“Median award amounts for medical malpractice trials
arising from death claims . . . and permanent injuries . . . were higher than the median awards for
medical malpractice trials that stemmed from temporary injuries . . . .”). See Studdert et al.,
Claims, Errors, and Compensation, supra note 9, for a discussion of settlement payments.
14. See Saks, supra note 7, at 1216–17.
15. See generally id.
16. See Hyman et al., supra note 12, at 53.
17. See Zeiler et al., supra note 11, at S39.
18. See Baker et al., Everything’s Bigger in Texas, supra note 12, at 2–4.
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liability coverage.19 But it would be a mistake to view policy limits
only as caps on injured patients’ recoveries because the existence of
insurance coverage is what enables patients to obtain compensation.
Insurers are the bankers for the tort system. Without them, the liabil-
ity system as we know it could not function.
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE
Medical malpractice insurance not only compensates injured pa-
tients ex post, it also promotes patient safety ex ante. In that regard, it
can be useful to think of medical malpractice insurance as serving a
regulatory function. We will discuss some of the ways that insurers
“regulate” medical practice, but first we would like to place this dis-
cussion into the larger context of the “insurance as governance” schol-
arship that has grown out of two social scientific research traditions.
The first is the law and economics tradition that has been so influen-
tial in U.S. legal scholarship generally. The second is a sociological
tradition that is less familiar to most U.S. legal scholars.
For present purposes, the seminal law and economics theoretical
work is that of Steven Shavell. Shavell used a deceptively simple
model to describe how the moral hazard of liability insurance could
undermine the deterrent effect of tort liability.20 As Shavell surely ap-
preciated, this was an old idea, present at the birth of liability insur-
ance in the late 19th Century.21 Shavell’s insight, and his impact on
law and economics scholarship, came from what he did next: He ex-
tended the model to account for risk-based pricing and other moral
hazard mitigation activities.22 This showed that even if these activities
could not entirely restore the deterrent effect of tort liability, the
overall social effect of tort liability with liability insurance was wel-
fare-enhancing because of the combination of loss prevention and loss
distribution benefits. Shavell’s work firmly linked liability and liability
insurance together in the law and economics literature, and it taught
legal economists to think about liability insurance in ways that made
19. Patients’ prospects may be better when they sue surgery centers, hospitals, or other insti-
tutions with sizeable assets that are not exempt from creditors.
20. See Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120, 122–23 (1982). See
generally Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, The Law and Economics of Liability Insurance: A
Theoretical and Empirical Review, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 169
(Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013), reprinted in 1 LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE (Daniel Schwarcz
ed., 2015).
21. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT
LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 (2008).
22. See generally Shavell, supra note 20.
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them more receptive than they might otherwise have been to the qual-
itative empirical legal scholarship that drew on sociological tradition.23
From sociology, there are two seminal sources for the concept of
“insurance as governance.” The first is a series of lectures that Michel
Foucault gave in Paris and Berkeley in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Together with work by his French and American students, these lec-
tures introduced a concept of insurance as governance that was more
critical and less mechanical than the model-based concept from law
and economics.24 Much less easily reduced to simple relationships
than the economics of insurance (and less influential in legal academic
work as a result), this research relies on qualitative methods and de-
tailed description. This methodology documents how insurance simul-
taneously “underwrites the ability to play with danger” and
“articulates standards of risk management that foster safety and secur-
ity,” while serving in this and other dimensions as the paradigmatic
institution of “governance beyond the state.”25 The second source is
Carol Heimer’s research on how insurance companies manage moral
hazard in insurance contracts.26 Her research revealed some of the
diverse and sometimes unpredictable ways that insurance organiza-
tions and institutions accomplish the abstract, moral hazard mitigation
assumed in Shavell’s models.27
The legal scholarship most strongly influenced by this sociological
research includes studies of fraternity risk management, corporate
governance, employment practices, police misconduct, and lawyers’
23. See, e.g., Baker & Siegelman, supra note 20; Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Out-
sourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 200 (2012);
Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5 REV. L.
& ECON. 541, 542 (2009).
24. For the best summary of Foucault’s thinking on governmentality and an excellent selection
of work by his students in this tradition, see generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE FOUCAULT EF-
FECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991). See also Jonathan
Simon, The Ideology of Actuarial Practices, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 771, 772–73 (1988).
25. RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 8 (2003); see also RICHARD
V. ERICSON & AARON DOYLE, UNCERTAIN BUSINESS: RISK, INSURANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF
KNOWLEDGE 47–48 (2004); INE VAN HOYWEGHEN, RISKS IN THE MAKING: TRAVELS IN LIFE
INSURANCE AND GENETICS 21 (2007).
26. See generally CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING
MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS (1985). For her contribution to the insurance as
regulation literature, see Carol A. Heimer, Insuring More, Ensuring Less: The Costs and Benefits
of Private Regulation Through Insurance, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF
INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 116 (Tom Baker & Jonathon Simon eds., 2002).
27. Carol Heimer was most interested in using insurance examples to demonstrate that mar-
kets need hierarchies and organizations, and she was less interested in developing a sociology of
insurance.
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professional liability.28 In each case, researchers have found insurers
engaging in loss prevention efforts, with the conspicuous exception of
directors and officers liability insurance sold to large, publicly traded
companies.29 While many fields remain to be explored in detail, there
is now a large body of research documenting what Ben-Shahar and
Logue describe as the “insurance-as-regulation paradigm” that pro-
vides indirect support for our claim that medical liability insurance
organizations promote patient safety ex ante.30
A. Liability Insurers Help Identify Negligent Providers
Although providers and their advocates often say otherwise,31 em-
pirical research suggests that malpractice settlements are both good
indicators of past negligence and good predictors of future claims.
They are good indicators because both the likelihood and the size of
payments correlate with the strength of the evidence of medical mal-
practice.32 They are good predictors because the number of past set-
tlements correlates with the likelihood that more payments will be
made.33 Settlements can serve as good proxies in these ways because,
generally, liability insurers are willing to pay claimants, and physicians
are willing to consent to settlements only when good evidence of mal-
practice exists.
28. See generally TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT:
HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2010); Tom Baker &
Rick Swedloff, Mutually Assured Protection Among Large U.S. Law Firms, 24 CONN. INS. L.J. 1
(2017); John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539
(2017); Jonathan Simon, In the Place of the Parent: Risk Management and the Government of
Campus Life, 3 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 15 (1994); Shauhin A. Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, and
Cyber Insurance, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 417 (2017); Shauhin Talesh, Legal Intermediaries: How
Insurance Companies Construct the Meaning of Compliance with Anti-Discrimination Laws, 37
L. & POL’Y 209 (2015).
29. See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 28, at 3 (“D&O insurance significantly erodes the
deterrent effect of shareholder litigation, thereby undermining its effectiveness as a form of reg-
ulation.”). For a comparison of D&O insurance to other kinds of insurance in this regard, see
generally Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers
Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412 (2013).
30. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 23, at 247.
31. See Lawrence E. Smarr, A Comparative Assessment of the PIAA Data Sharing Project and
the National Practitioner Data Bank: Policy, Purpose, and Application, 60 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 59, 68 (1997) (“Monetary settlements to patients are often not indicative of negligent
treatment by a physician.”).
32. See generally Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation, supra note 9.
33. See David M. Studdert et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of Physicians Prone to Mal-
practice Claims, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 354, 358 (2016); Anna Almendrala, Many Doctors Who
Face Malpractice Suits Are Serial Offenders, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 29, 2016, 11:56 AM), https:/
/www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/doctors-malpractice-research_us_56a94bece4b05e4e37033d00
(explaining that doctors who have already paid multiple malpractice settlements are more likely
to be involved in another settlement).
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Given the diagnostic and predictive value of settlements, it should
not be surprising to learn that the health care system uses them to
identify providers who may pose dangers to patients. For example, in
1986, Congress created the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB)
as a repository for information about malpractice payments, state dis-
ciplinary actions, and clinical practice restrictions. The NPDB includes
reports on physicians, nurses, dentists, and other professionals filed by
hospitals, liability insurers, state medical boards, and other entities.34
In theory, the NPDB can help state medical licensing boards iden-
tify dangerous physicians. When doctors seek to renew their licenses
or apply for licenses in new states, the boards can query the database
and learn about problems in applicants’ pasts. In practice, however,
boards consult the NPDB infrequently. “In 2017, 30 state medical
boards in the U.S. backgrounded a physician using the database fewer
than 100 times, according to numbers from the Health Resources and
Service Administration. Thirteen boards didn’t even check it once.”35
As a result, many physicians with checkered histories slip through the
cracks. From 2011 to 2016, “more than 500 physicians” did so.36 These
doctors had troubled pasts, including prescription drug problems, un-
safe or unnecessary surgeries, and improper sexual relations with pa-
tients. Despite having been “chastised by one state medical board,”
they were “able to hang their shingles at a new address with a ‘clean’
license” because the NPDB was not queried.37
Hospitals are required to consult the NPDB whenever new practi-
tioners apply for privileges and every two years thereafter. The conse-
quence of failing to query the database when required is that a
hospital “is presumed to have knowledge of any information reported
to the NPDB concerning the practitioner.”38 This information may be
“use[d] in litigation against the hospital” by an attorney representing
an injured patient.39 In fact, hospitals take the duty to consult the
NPDB seriously, and the information it contains often affects their
34. See generally NAT’L PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., NPDB-00921.04.00, FACT SHEET ON THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK
(2008), https://www.ire.org/media/uploads/files/datalibrary/npdb/factsheet.pdf [hereinafter PRAC-
TITIONER DATA BANK FACT SHEET].
35. Matt Wynn & John Fauber, NPDB Records Often Ignored in Docs’ Licensing, MEDPAGE
TODAY (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.medpagetoday.com/special-reports/states-of-disgrace/71600.
36. Id.
37. John Fauber, Matt Wynn, & Kristina Fiore, States of Disgrace: A Flawed System Fails to
Inform the Public, MEDPAGE TODAY (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.medpagetoday.com/special-
reports/statesofdisgrace/71418.
38. PRACTITIONER DATA BANK FACT SHEET, supra note 34, at 2.
39. Id.
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credentialing decisions.40 “[I]n its first 13.3 years of operation . . . the
NPDB processed more than 32 million queries.”41 Hospitals made
34% of them.42
Hospitals appear to be less serious about reporting to the NPDB,
however. One study found that more than two-thirds of the hospitals
examined reported no adverse events to the NPDB over a five-year
span.43 Another estimated that 75% of “potentially reportable ac-
tions” and 60% of “unquestionably reportable actions” went unre-
ported.44 These omissions reduce the NPDB’s value.
Providers’ use of the so-called corporate shield impairs the NPDB’s
completeness too. The shield is employed when “the medical corpora-
tion for which the doctor works is named in the suit, and the doctor is
either not originally named or is released specifically for the purpose
of avoiding a report to the NPDB.”45 Although the extent to which
this tactic reduces the number of payments that are reportable to the
NPDB is not known, some authors believe that one-half of otherwise
reportable adverse events are deflected by this means.46
Given Congress’ decision to create the NPDB, it seems natural to
regard the use of the “corporate shield” as a vice that denies the
NPDB’s users of valuable information. But some advocates of early
dispute resolution and quality improvement regard it as a virtue and
discuss their use of the shield openly.
The University of Michigan Health System avowedly uses the cor-
porate shield, and its settlements are generally in the institution’s
name. UMHS is a staff-model institution in which physicians are
employees rather than independent contractors, hence under this
approach “reporting of individual caregivers in medical malpractice
claims in the National Practitioner Data Bank is rare. However, full
claims histories are maintained and reported for each involved
caregiver, as required.” In other words, UMHS emphasizes thor-
ough internal peer review as part of its overall quality process. Even
though it rarely reports medical malpractice payments, it still ac-
40. See generally Teresa M. Waters et al., The Role of the National Practitioner Data Bank in
the Credentialing Process, 21 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 30, 31–32 (2006).
41. Id. at 32.
42. Id.
43. See Laure-Mae Baldwin et al., Hospital Peer Review and the National Practitioner Data
Bank: Clinical Privileges Action Reports, 282 JAMA 349, 351 (1999).
44. Waters et al., supra note 40, at 37.
45. Smarr, supra note 31, at 67.
46. See Haavi Morreim, Malpractice, Mediation, and Moral Hazard: The Virtues of Dodging
the Data Bank, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 109, 138 (2012) (“By the mid-1990s, somewhere
around 50% of otherwise-required NPDB reports were thought to be diverted via the corporate
shield.”).
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tively reports adverse actions on a provider’s privileges or creden-
tials to the NPDB.47
Whether the benefits of the “corporate shield” exceed its costs is un-
known, but the several authors who recommend eliminating the re-
quirement to report malpractice payments to the NPDB presumably
think the benefits do exceed the costs.48
Because malpractice settlements send reliable, if noisy, signals of
provider quality, state medical boards often use them to trigger inves-
tigations of physicians. For example, the Texas Medical Board is re-
quired to review “the medical competency of a licensee if three or
more separate lawsuits and/or settlements are reported to the board
based on health care liability claims within a five-year period.”49 Phy-
sicians licensed in California are required to report “civil judgments,
settlements, and arbitration awards” to that state’s medical board
too.50 In effect, these governmental bodies rely on private litigation.
In particular, the governmental bodies rely on liability insurers’ will-
ingness to make payments to identify negligent providers instead of
expending the resources that would be needed to do so themselves.
By enacting tort reform laws that make settlements less common,
many states have prevented this arrangement from working as it pre-
viously did.51
B. Liability Insurers Provide Incentives for Patient Safety by
Charging Risk-Adjusted Premiums and Denying Coverage
to High-Risk Providers
The conventional wisdom has long been that medical malpractice
insurers do not charge risk-based premiums. Thus, medical liability
insurance premiums do not provide the usual loss prevention incen-
tives of other kinds of liability insurance, except to the extent that the
leaders of a medical specialty society decide to take on a goal of re-
47. Id. at 140 (quoting Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs Before and After
Implementation of a Medical Error Disclosure Program, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 213, 214
(2010)).
48. Id.; see also William M. Sage et al., Bridging the Relational-Regulatory Gap: A Pragmatic
Information Policy for Patient Safety and Medical Malpractice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1263, 1264
(2006).
49. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 176.8 (2017).
50. JULIANNE D’ANGELO FELLMETH & THOMAS A. PAPAGEORGE, FINAL REPORT: MEDICAL
BOARD OF CALIFORNIA ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM MONITOR 5 (2005).
51. On the impact tort reform laws have had on disciplinary actions by state medical boards,
see generally Paul Jesilow & Julianne Ohlander, The Impact of Tort Reforms on the Sanctioning
of Physicians by State Licensing Boards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 117 (2010).
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ducing the liability exposure of their specialty.52 Although this con-
ventional wisdom may have been true for physicians, liability
insurance for hospitals and other health care enterprises has tradition-
ally been underwritten on an individualized, risk-adjusted basis.53
Three trends are increasing the degree to which health care enter-
prises’ medical liability insurance arrangements are risk-based. First,
like large organizations in the United States generally,54 health care
organizations are retaining more risk55 through self-insured reten-
tions, captive insurance,56 and mutual insurance arrangements involv-
52. For documentation of this conventional understanding, see Shirley Svorny, Could
Mandatory Caps On Medical Malpractice Damages Harm Consumers?, 685 CATO POLICY
ANALYSIS 4 (2011), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa685.pdf. The most fa-
mous example of a medical society taking on the goal of reducing liability exposure is anesthesi-
ology. See, e.g., BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH, supra note 2, at 108–10.
53. See generally MICHELLE M. MELLO, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSUR-
ANCE: A PRIMER (2006) (reporting that experience rating is not used for physicians, but that
25% of hospitals’ total insurance premiums are based on experience).
54. For a discussion of the trend that corporations in general are retaining more risk, see
SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 527 (2d
ed. 2004) (reporting that “medium to large business insurance policies often include relatively
large deductibles or self-insured retentions”); Tom Baker, The Shifting Terrain of Risk and Un-
certainty on the Liability Insurance Field, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 521, 535 (2011) (“There is one
major cross-cutting development in the commercial lines marketplace that is worth singling out:
businesses of all kinds are retaining greater levels of risk, as represented by the rising deductibles
and self-insured retentions.”).
55. For an account of the general phenomenon that health care organizations are also retain-
ing more risk, see Randall R. Bovbjerg, Beyond Tort Reform: Fixing Real Problems, 3 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 3, 7 (2006) (“More medical providers have also turned to unconventional,
alternative risk mechanisms such as risk-retention groups, or, for hospitals, self insurance. Like
claims made policies, these arrangements offer somewhat less protection than major carrier cov-
erage: They have less capital for emergencies, and they are not backstopped by state guaranty
funds that protect insureds in the case of conventional insurers’ insolvency.”).
56. For more information regarding self-insured retentions and captive insurance, see RISK
MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK FOR HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 19 (Roberta L. Carroll ed.,
2009) [hereinafter RISK MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK] (“One strategy for managing an identified
risk is risk retention. This treatment strategy involves assuming the potential losses associated
with a given risk and making plans to cover the financial consequences of such losses. The reten-
tion options open to health care organizations include current expensing of losses, using an un-
funded loss reserve (an accounting entry denoting a potential liability to pay for a loss), using a
funded loss reserve (a reserve backed by set-aside funds within the organization), borrowing
funds to pay for losses, and providing insurance through an affiliated captive insurer.”); Margo
Schlanger, Operationalizing Deterrence: Claims Management (in Hospitals, a Large Retailer, and
Jails and Prisons), 2 J. TORT L. 1, 49 (2008) (citing Michelle M. Mello et al., Hospitals’ Behavior
in a Tort Crisis: Observations from Pennsylvania, 22 HEALTH AFF. 225, 229 (2003)) (“[L]arge
teaching hospitals very often use a form of self-insurance known as captive insurers, in which the
hospital owns the primary insurer and therefore retains all but catastrophic risk.”). For an intro-
duction to captive insurance companies, see, for example, INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS,
ISSUES PAPER ON THE REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANIES
(Oct. 2006), https://www.iaisweb.org/page/supervisory-material/issues-papers/file/34279/issues-
paper-on-regulation-and-supervision-of-captive-insurance-companies-october-2006.
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ing multiple organizations.57 Second, the consolidation of health care
organizations means that an increasingly large share of health care is
provided in hospitals and other organizations with the scale needed to
take advantage of these alternative risk mechanisms.58 Third, the de-
57. For information regarding mutual insurance arrangements involving multiple organiza-
tions, see DONNA K. HAMMAKER & THOMAS M. KNADIG, HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT AND
THE LAW 60 (2d ed. 2018) (“The University of Pennsylvania (along with 17 other colleges and
universities) were investors and early backers of Collegiate Health Care Corp. (CHCC), the
nation’s first interuniversity managed care organization. CHCC attempted to develop a mutual
health insurance plan for college students. More than 100 schools participated in the nationwide
effort before the concept was abandoned, primarily because of its complexity.”); Agnus Smith,
Co-Op Health Insurance – Cooperative Healthcare Plans, FIRST QUOTE HEALTH (June 14, 2018),
https://www.firstquotehealth.com/health-insurance-news/co-op-health-insurance (“Health insur-
ance co-ops are a type of mutual insurance plan. A mutual insurance plan is a plan that is owned
and operated by the members of the group that owns the plan. All of the money that is earned
by the group directly benefits its members by reducing costs (e.g. premiums), being distributed
to the members, or being held within the group to benefit the entire group, which is why co-op
health insurance plans are so affordable.”).
58. For documentation regarding the consolidation of health care organizations, see Robert I.
Field, Government as the Crucible for Free Market Health Care: Regulation, Reimbursement, and
Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1719–20 (2011) (“During the 1990s, as large, national managed
care companies swallowed smaller local ones, their bargaining clout drove down fees paid to
hospitals and physicians in many markets. This, in turn, led many providers to consolidate into
health systems, hospital chains, and large physician-group practices to try to gain a better negoti-
ating position. By the end of the 1990s, much of American health care had become a more
centralized enterprise. In effect, the rise of managed care revised the organizational structure of
health care provision overall . . . .”). On the movement of physicians into salaried staff positions
with hospitals, see Bonnie Darves, Understanding the Physician Employment “Movement”,
NEJM CAREERCENTER (July 23, 2014), http://www.nejmcareercenter.org/article/understanding-
the-physician-employment-movement-/. On consolidation in the hospital sector, see Matthew
Kandrach, Hospital Consolidation Is Driving Up Consumer Costs, REALCLEARHEALTH (Feb. 1,
2018), https://www.realclearhealth.com/articles/2018/02/01/hospital_consolidation_is_driving_up_
consumer_costs_110764.html. For a discussion of the relationship between scale and alternative
risk mechanisms, see JOHN KOSTER ET AL., N=1: HOW THE UNIQUENESS OF EACH INDIVIDUAL
IS TRANSFORMING HEALTHCARE 101, 106 (2015) (“Scale matters in delivering coordinated care.
To deliver care across the continuum and to effectively manage the health of populations, scale is
necessary. . . . Collaboration in information and data management is rapidly growing. The scale
necessary to fully utilize big data and predictive analytics is beyond any single organization.
Cloud computing is, by definition, scalable.”); RISK MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at
202 (“Health care organizations with collaborative ties have the benefit of identifying and ana-
lyzing adverse events and occurrences on a larger scale than is possible with data generated only
internally.”); Mu-Sheng Chang, Alternative Risk Transfer: Evidence of Self-Insurance Among
Hospitals in Pennsylvania for Workers’ Compensation Liability, 27 J. INS. REG., Winter 2008, at
59, 69–70 (“Even small or medium firms can self-insure under a consolidated self-insurance pro-
gram. Therefore, in self-insurance, it is crucial whether a hospital, especially of small or medium
size, is a member of a health care system. The system—an alliance of numerous health care
providers—may experience the benefit of scale and/or scope economies by providing a complete
spectrum of medical services and exercising purchasing power in obtaining supplies. Affiliated
hospitals in a health care system are more likely to make similar decisions in assuming their WC
liability. Due to economies of scale, the presence of a health care system offers an incentive for a
hospital in the choice of self-insurance.”); Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson, Change,
Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 141, 147
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cline of self-employed physicians means that an increasingly large
share of physicians work in an “enterprise insurance” environment.59
Providing the liability insurance for the physicians and other provid-
ers who practice in enterprise facilities gives the enterprise obvious
incentives to manage the liability exposure of those providers. Per-
haps less obviously, enterprise liability insurance gives the administra-
tive leaders of the hospital or medical school a lever to control
physicians that is more fine-tuned than the “shape up or ship out”
control that can be hard to exercise when a physician has tenure or a
large practice. For example, in an informal interview we conducted
with a former university official we learned of an instance in which a
university was able to use its control over liability insurance for faculty
members to stop a tenured medical school clinical faculty member
from continuing to engage in a high-risk procedure.60
Moreover, Shirley Svorny’s qualitative research on the medical lia-
bility insurance market suggests that the conventional wisdom no
longer holds true even for physicians who purchase their own medical
malpractice insurance.61 Individual medical malpractice insurers gen-
erally charge premiums based on the location and medical specialty of
the physician, not the physician’s individual experience or characteris-
tics.62 But not all insurers are willing to insure all physicians. As
Svorny explained, “[t]hough some experience rating takes place
among physicians insured by a specific carrier, most experience rating
takes place across carriers.”63 She reported three categories of insur-
ers: (1) insurers that “pick physicians with spotless records,” (2) insur-
ers that “underwrite physicians with somewhat higher risk,” and (3)
surplus lines carriers that are willing to insure physicians who cannot
get other coverage, for premiums that vary from “150 to 500 percent
(1999) (“The trend toward horizontal consolidation is in part a response to changing factors in
the health care market, like declining demand for inpatient hospital services, economies of scale,
the shifting of risk from private and public insurers to providers, greater price and quality sensi-
tivity on the part of buyers, and selective contracting by managed care organizations.”).
59. See generally Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice Insurance Reform: “Enterprise Insurance”
and Some Alternatives, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 267
(William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006). As of 2016, less than half of all physicians in the
U.S. were owners of the organization in which they worked, and about one-third of all physicians
worked in hospital-owned practices or directly for a hospital. See generally Carol K. Kane, Policy
Research Perspectives: Updated Data on Physician Practice Arrangements: Physician Ownership
Drops Below 50 Percent, AMA (May 2017), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-
browser/public/health-policy/PRP-2016-physician-benchmark-survey.pdf.
60. See Interview with former university official (Dec. 21, 2017) (notes on file with authors).
61. See Svorny, supra note 52, at 4–5.
62. Id. at 6.
63. Id. at 6.
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of those in standard markets.”64 Svorny quoted a medical liability in-
surance underwriter as follows:
I’m surprised that people have difficulty believing physicians’ mal-
practice premiums are impacted by the practitioner’s loss experi-
ence. Virtually every professional liability line has a premium
modification formula for prior losses. Virtually every insurance cov-
erage line discerns, on the basis of price risks with and without
claims. Large risks—with credible experience—are specifically loss
rated by actuaries. Small risks or risks without enough credibility on
a stand-alone basis are pooled with other like/kind risks and within
that pool, risks with prior losses will pay more.65
In sum, medical liability insurance premiums are risk-based to a signif-
icant extent and thus, do provide the kind of loss prevention incen-
tives that are assumed in Shavell’s economic models. How medical
provider organizations respond to those incentives is, of course, an
empirical question. Put simply, our point here is that risk-based pric-
ing is one way that medical liability insurance promotes patient safety.
C. Liability Insurers Accumulate Data for Root Cause Analysis
Insurers’ claim files often contain a wealth of information that can
help identify the root causes of medical errors, and they can also be
used to reduce both the likelihood of mistakes and the severity of the
injuries they cause. The first association of medical professionals to
have examined insurers’ claim files for these purposes appears to be
the American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA), whose Closed
Claim Project began in 1985.66 The ASA’s database includes
thousands of anesthesia-related malpractice claims provided by more
than thirty-five participating liability carriers.67 Over decades, hun-
dreds of anesthesiologists have examined these files, which typically
contain “hospital records, anesthetic records, narrative statements of
involved personnel, expert and peer reviews, deposition summaries,
outcome reports, and settlement or award details,” and which provide
“recorded findings using a standard data collection form.”68 The ASA
has published dozens of studies based on their findings.
64. Id. at 7; see also Brandon Stahl, High-risk Health Providers Stay in Business Thanks to
State Insurance, STAR TRIBUNE (May 6, 2013, 6:16 PM) (describing how the Minnesota Joint
Underwriting Association, a state-created insurer of last resort, provides coverage for doctors
who cannot obtain conventional insurance).
65. Svorny, supra note 52, at 8.
66. Meghan G. MacRae, Close Claims Studies in Anesthesia: A Literature Review and Implica-
tions for Practice, 75 AM. ASS’N NURSE ANESTHETISTS J. 267, 267 (2007).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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By shedding light on the types of injuries that occur and their fre-
quency, the ASA’s closed claim studies generated professional sup-
port for changes in anesthesia procedures that protected millions of
patients from harm. Following the completion of a study published in
1990, the ASA’s Committee on Standards promulgated new treatment
guidelines that required pulse oximetry and end-tidal carbon dioxide
verification of endotracheal intubation, and that governed the man-
agement of difficult airways. By reducing the frequency and severity
of injuries, these guidelines also protected anesthesiologists from mal-
practice claims and made their liability coverage cheaper. In To Err Is
Human, the Institute of Medicine’s landmark report on medical er-
rors, the ASA’s Closed Claim Project was touted as a model of patient
safety.69
Even so, other professional societies were slow to follow the ASA’s
lead. Instead of devoting resources to the study of root causes, they
sought to reduce their members’ exposure to liability claims by lobby-
ing for damages caps and other restrictions on lawsuits. These efforts
benefited their members, but likely harmed patients by reducing the
pressure the liability system exerted on providers to improve patient
safety.
Eventually, however, a few other professional associations saw the
value of closed claims studies and followed suit. The American Asso-
ciation of Nurse Anesthetists, a group whose research interests paral-
lel those of the ASA, published its first study of closed claims
involving Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists in 2001.70 In 2012,
an examination of “[t]he websites of all recognized medical specialties
in the United States” found that obstetricians had also stepped up to
the plate.71 One study of closed claims involving brain-injured chil-
dren “led to the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive
redesign of the patient safety process,” which was employed:
[A]t the Hospital Corporation of America, the nation’s largest pri-
vate healthcare delivery system [with approximately 220,000 deliv-
eries performed annually]. Working with a clinical advisory board
and work group consisting of physicians and nurses, uniform
processes, procedures, and checklists were developed. Every mem-
ber of the obstetric team was empowered and required to intervene
and halt any process deemed to be dangerous, and effective peer-
review policies were instituted. Improved perinatal outcomes were
69. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 3, at 144–45.
70. See generally Lorraine M. Jordan et al., Data-driven Practice Improvement: The AANA
Foundation Closed Malpractice Claims Study, 69 AM. ASS’N NURSE ANESTHETISTS J. 301 (2001).
71. Steven E. Pegalis & B. Sonny Bal, Closed Medical Negligence Claims Can Drive Patient
Safety and Reduce Litigation, 470 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 1398, 1399 (2012).
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realized with a lower maternity and fetal injury rate, lower primary
cesarean delivery rate, and reduced rates of litigation.72
A second study by obstetricians used payouts and sentinel events in
claims involving brain-injured newborns delivered at a major hospital
in New York “to compare the delivery of care before and after the
implementation of safety initiatives. The authors reported that the av-
erage compensation payment decreased dramatically from more than
$27 million per year to approximately $2.5 million per year and that
sentinel events decreased from five per year to none.”73 Claim-based
studies of obstetrics patient safety programs introduced at other hos-
pitals have since yielded similar results.74
As they did for anesthesiologists, closed claims studies also moti-
vated obstetricians to support treatment guidelines as a means of re-
ducing exposure to liability claims. Often, opposition to guidelines
runs strong among providers, who deride them as “cookbook
medicine.”75 This was as true for obstetricians as for other physicians.
[I]n the two decades that followed implementation of the ASA
safety guidelines, the posture of the obstetric community had been
one of inaction. However, once the benefit of safety measures in the
obstetric field were clear, one author that investigated this subject
remarked that “Malpractice loss is best avoided by reduction in ad-
verse outcomes and the development of unambiguous practice
72. Id. at 1401 (citing Steven L. Clark et al., Improved Outcomes, Fewer Caesarean Deliveries,
and Reduced Litigation: Results of a New Paradigm in Patient Safety, 199 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 105.e1 (2008)).
73. Id. (citing Amos Grunebaum et al., Effect of a Comprehensive Obstetric Patient Safety
Program on Compensation Payments and Sentinel Events, 204 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOL-
OGY 97, 97 (2011)).
74. See Christian M. Pettker et al., A Comprehensive Obstetric Patient Safety Program
Reduces Liability Claims and Payments, 211 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 319, 319 (2014)
(explaining that Yale-New Haven Hospital’s obstetric program decreased the number of claims
and payments significantly); William Riley et al., Decreasing Malpractice Claims by Reducing
Preventable Perinatal Harm, 51 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 2453, 2453 (2016) (“There is a significant
reduction in the number of perinatal malpractice claims paid, losses paid, and indemnity pay-
ments . . . following interventions to improve perinatal patient safety and reduce perinatal
harm.”).
75. See Patricia C. Crowley, No Pain, No Gain? The Agency for Health Care Policy & Re-
search’s Attempt to Change Inefficient Health Care Practice of Withholding Medication From
Patients in Pain, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 383, 400 (1994) (“[T]he medical commu-
nity has long been suspicious of developing guidelines for medical care ‘because of fears that
they could lead to standardized “cookbook medicine” that dictate specific treatments and inter-
fere with the doctor-patient relationship.’”); William R. Trail & Brad A. Allen, Government
Created Medical Practice Guidelines: The Opening of Pandora’s Box, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 231,
239–40 (1995) (“The American Medical Association (AMA) first dismissed practice guidelines
as ‘cookbook medicine.’”); Shelly Reese, Will You Be Pressured to Perform ‘Cookbook’
Medicine?, MEDSCAPE (July 30, 2013), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/808258 (explaining
that physicians see clinical practice guidelines as “potentially valuable tools that, if mishandled,
can become a hefty, skull-crushing medical cookbook”).
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guidelines, rather than by attempting to make unusual care more
‘defensible’ through the use of nonspecific guidelines.”76
When shown that they can help patients while also protecting them-
selves from malpractice suits, physicians’ attitudes toward guidelines
can change.
Although anesthesiologists and obstetricians appear to be the only
medical professionals to have developed treatment guidelines after
studying closed malpractice claims, other providers are also using
closed claims to enhance their understanding of medical errors. Re-
cent years have seen the publication of closed claim studies by nurse
practitioners,77 cardiologists,78 radiologists,79 and ophthalmologists,80
for example. But it remains true that professional societies could mine
this resource much more deeply than they have.
Liability insurers and their industry groups have facilitated and sup-
plemented the work of physicians and their professional societies by
sharing closed claim data, providing analyses, and developing treat-
ment guidelines of their own. The Doctors Company has produced
closed claim studies of malpractice cases in which the defendant prov-
iders were nurse practitioners, general practitioners, obstetricians, car-
diologists, plastic surgeons, hospitalists, and other physicians.81 It has
also produced clinical practice guidelines for several specialties and
for specific treatments, such as removal of pigmented skin lesions82
and handling hospitalized patients who are obese.83 Working with the
National Patient Safety Foundation, The Doctors Company Founda-
tion sponsored RCA2: Improving Root Cause Analyses and Actions to
Prevent Harm, a volume whose purpose “is to ensure that efforts un-
dertaken in performing RCA2 [Root Cause Analysis and Action] will
76. Pegalis & Bal, supra note 71, at 1401 (quoting Clark et al., supra note 72, at 105.e2).
77. See, e.g., June Leigh & Jennifer Flynn, Enhance Patient Safety by Identifying and Minimiz-
ing Risk Exposures Affecting Nurse Practitioner Practice, 33 J. HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT.
27 (2013).
78. See, e.g., William J. Oetgen, Characteristics of Medical Professional Liability Claims in
Patients with Cardiovascular Diseases, 105 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 745 (2010).
79. See, e.g., Michea´l A. Breen et al., Pediatric Radiology Malpractice Claim—Characteristics
and Comparison to Adult Radiology Claims, 47 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 808 (2017); H. Benjamin
Harvey et al., Radiology Malpractice Claims in the United States From 2008 to 2012: Characteris-
tics and Implications, 13 J. AM. C. RADIOLOGY 124 (2016).
80. See, e.g., Tamara R. Fountain, Ophthalmic Malpractice and Physician Gender: A Claims
Data Analysis (An American Ophthalmological Society Thesis), 112 TRANSACTIONS AM. OPH-
THALMOLOGICAL SOC’Y 38 (2014).
81. See Closed Claim Studies, DOCTORS CO., https://www.thedoctors.com/articles/closed-
claims-studies/ (last visited June 6, 2018) (collecting closed claim studies).
82. See David Charles, Removing a Pigmented Skin Lesion, DOCTORS CO., https://www.thedoc
tors.com/articles/removing-a-pigmented-skin-lesion/ (last updated May 2000).
83. See Paul Nagle, Caring for the Hospitalized Obese Patient, DOCTORS CO., https://www
.thedoctors.com/articles/caring-for-the-hospitalized-obese-patient/ (last updated Feb. 2017).
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result in the identification and implementation of sustainable systems-
based improvements that make patient care safer in settings across the
continuum of care.”84
The Controlled Risk Insurance Company (CRICO), created by the
Harvard Medical organizations in the mid-1970s to provide liability
insurance for those organizations, used closed claim data to improve
the quality of care received by breast cancer patients.
[I]n the 1990s when many physicians were being sued for failure to
diagnose breast cancer, CRICO found their insured physicians had
no uniform approach to monitoring breast lumps. The insurance
firm developed a standard treatment algorithm, offered insured
physicians who used it an insurance premium discount, and dramati-
cally reduced litigation.85
Today, CRICO has an ongoing project known as Strategies for Pa-
tient Safety, which “explores the myriad ways 30-plus years of analyz-
ing medical malpractice data can guide physicians and nurses
practicing amidst today’s patient safety risks.”86 CRICO calls its medi-
cal malpractice database the Comparative Benchmarking System
(CBS), and boasts that CBS contains “approximately 30 percent of all
US malpractice cases.”87 With nearly 400,000 cases involving 175,000
physicians and 400 hospitals, CBS is a remarkably rich source of infor-
mation for many aspects of patient safety.88
CRICO has mined CBS extensively. Its website lists an array of evi-
dence-based guidelines, offers extensive decision support tools and
treatment algorithms, provides detailed checklists for physicians to
follow, and enables physicians to evaluate themselves by completing
testing modules. Other insurance companies draw upon CBS too, in-
cluding The Doctors Company and MMIC, whose biannual publica-
tion Brink puts the latest findings from closed claim studies into
insured physicians’ hands.89
84. NAT’L PATIENT SAFETY FOUND., RCA2: IMPROVING ROOT CAUSE ANALYSES AND AC-
TIONS TO PREVENT HARM, at vii (2015).
85. Mary Chaffee, Extracting Medical Injury Information from the Legal System to Improve
Patient Safety in the Health System: A Social Utility Approach, 11 U. MASS. L. REV. 372, 391
(2016).
86. CRICO, Strategies for Patient Safety (SPS), HARVARD (Apr. 4, 2018) https://www.rmf.har
vard.edu/Clinician-Resources/Newsletter-and-Publication/2011/CRICO-SPS-Past-Issues.
87. CRICO, How Does Your Organization Compare? Comparative Benchmarking System
(CBS), HARVARD, https://www.rmf.harvard.edu/Products-and-Services/CRICO-Strategies-Prod
ucts-and-Services/CBS (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
88. See id.; see also Jock Hoffman, Where Things Go Wrong, CRICO (Oct. 31, 2017), https://
www.rmf.harvard.edu/Clinician-Resources/Newsletter-and-Publication/2017/SPS-Where-Things-
Go-Wrong.
89. See Brink Magazine, MMIC, https://www.mmicgroup.com/resources/stay-current/brink-
magazine (last visited Mar. 12, 2018). MMIC was formerly known as the Midwest Medical Insur-
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The Medical Profession Liability Association (formerly known as
the Physician Insurers Association of America) has long maintained a
Data Sharing Project (DSP) that produces reports for its members.
The DSP is designed:
[T]o provide evidence of the medical conditions, procedures, and
practices that give rise to medical malpractice claims. It relies on a
complex code system incorporating the International Classification
of Diseases, 9th. Clinical Modification (ICD-9), to identify medical
conditions and treatments, and on other systems of specialized
codes to account for medico-legal issues.90
In doing so, the DSP “provides key information for . . . insurance com-
panies and stakeholders with an interest in patient safety . . . [and
includes] . . . the necessary statistical information needed to enhance
risk management in medicine.”91
Academic researchers have also used closed claim databases to gen-
erate a host of insights concerning patient safety. With funding from
CRICO and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, a team
of researchers led by David M. Studdert studied a dataset that cov-
ered approximately 33,000 physicians, 61 acute care hospitals, and 428
outpatient facilities, using claim files provided by malpractice insur-
ance companies across the United States. Dubbed the Malpractice In-
surers’ Medical Error Surveillance and Prevention Study
(MIMESPS), the research effort produced eight studies of health care
quality and patient safety,92 plus three articles on the operation of the
malpractice liability system.93 On the former topic, the problems ad-
dressed included instruments and sponges left inside surgery patients,
ance Company. History, MMIC, https://www.mmicgroup.com/about/who-we-are/history (select
“1988” from the “Select Year” drop-down menu) (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
90. Smarr, supra note 31, at 59.
91. MPL Association Data Sharing Project: Learning from Medical and Professional Liability
Claims and Trends, MED. PROF. LIABILITY ASS’N, https://www.mplassociation.org/wcm/Data_
Sharing_Project/wcm/_Data_Sharing_Project/What_is_the_DSP.aspx (last visited May 29, 2018).
92. See generally Tejal K. Gandhi et al., Missed and Delayed Diagnoses in the Ambulatory
Setting: A Study of Closed Malpractice Claims, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 488 (2006); Atul A.
Gawande et al., Risk Factors for Retained Instruments and Sponges After Surgery, 348 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 229 (2003); Caprice C. Greenberg et al., Patterns of Communication Breakdowns Result-
ing in Injury to Surgical Patients, 204 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 533 (2007); Kachalia et al., supra note
2; Mary R. Kwaan et al., Incidence, Patterns, and Prevention of Wrong-Site Surgery, 141
ARCHIVES SURGERY 353 (2006); Regenbogen et al., supra note 2; Selwyn O. Rogers et al., Anal-
ysis of Surgical Errors in Closed Malpractice Claims at 4 Liability Insurers, 140 SURGERY 25
(2006); Singh et al., supra note 2.
93. See generally Michelle M. Mello & David M. Studdert, Deconstructing Negligence: The
Role of Individual and System Factors in Causing Medical Injuries, 96 GEO. L.J. 600 (2008);
Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation, supra note 9; David M. Studdert & Michelle
M. Mello, When Tort Resolutions Are “Wrong”: Predictors of Discordant Outcomes in Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 47 (2007).
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wrong-site surgery, mistaken and delayed diagnoses, and communica-
tion breakdowns, among others. MIMESPS used physician-reviewers
to determine whether errors occurred and to establish causes, insofar
as possible.
MIMESPS has had important collateral effects. For example, in
hope of taking the MIMESPS approach a large step further, the Stan-
ford University Medical Center built an Enterprise Risk Management
system that combines closed claim data analysis with other sources of
information with the goal of identifying both risks to patients and op-
portunities to improve.94 Seeing the value that MIMESPS extracted
from closed claim data, commentators have also called for greater ac-
cess to medical malpractice settlements, the terms of which are often
confidential.95
In view of the secular decline in the volume of medical malpractice
cases, closed claims may be a less valuable resource in the future than
they were in the past.96 Whether they continue to have significant
value depends on several factors. First, to an unknown degree, the
reported decline may reflect more widespread use of the “corporate
shield,” discussed above, rather than a real reduction in claim fre-
quency. If that is so, then hospitals and insurers will continue to have
access to valuable information, and researchers with whom they share
data will as well. To the extent that the decline in claim frequency
reflects the progressive exclusion of small claims from the liability sys-
tem, information will be lost, but larger claims, which tend to involve
94. See generally Jeffrey Driver & Rene´e Bernard, Enterprise Risk Management, in THE
SAGES MANUAL OF QUALITY, OUTCOMES AND PATIENT SAFETY 529 (David S. Tichansky, John
Morton, & Daniel B. Jones eds., 2012).
95. See generally Chaffee, supra note 85. On confidentiality provisions in settlements, see Wil-
liam M. Sage et al., Use of Nondisclosure Agreements in Medical Malpractice Settlements by a
Large Academic Health Care System, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1130, 1131–33 (2015). In addi-
tion to utilizing closed claim data put together by malpractice insurers, hospitals and other medi-
cal providers often benefit from and analyze their own claim management data. Margo
Schlanger suggests that “claim management practices . . . [in hospitals] produce an important
secondary effect of enabling and encouraging a variety of harm-prevention or accident-avoid-
ance measures.” See Schlanger, supra note 56, at 8 (suggesting that in hospitals, large retailers,
and prisons, claim management strategies and personnel contribute to harm prevention). Like
insurers, hospitals collect information about possible claims, through various reporting systems.
“[E]very hospital has in place a policy for the reporting, investigation (‘root cause analysis’), and
systemic response (‘action plan’) to every ‘sentinel event.’” Schlanger, supra note 56, at 28. Hos-
pitals then analyze claim files and incident reports, allowing them to “assess safety and quality of
care problems . . . [and] design useful interventions.” Schlanger, supra note 56, at 31.
96. See Myungho Paik, Bernard Black, & David A. Hyman, The Receding Tide of Medical
Malpractice Litigation: Part 1—National Trends, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 612, 624–25
(2013); Myungho Paik, Bernard Black, & David A. Hyman, The Receding Tide of Medical Mal-
practice Litigation: Part 2—Effect of Damage Caps, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 639, 645–47
(2013).
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severe injuries and solid evidence of negligence, will remain. Argua-
bly, the latter cases identify defects in delivery systems that are most
worth fixing.
D. Liability Insurers Conduct Loss Prevention Inspections
of Medical Facilities
Medical malpractice insurers routinely conduct loss prevention in-
spections of medical facilities in two contexts: (1) as part of the under-
writing process when providing liability insurance for the facility and
(2) as a service offered outside of the underwriting process, typically
without a fee to the facilities that they insure. Documenting the full
extent of underwriting inspections would require extensive qualitative
research, but the conventional wisdom within the industry is that such
inspections are a routine occurrence.97 Medical liability insurers ad-
vertise the fact that they provide loss prevention services outside of
the underwriting process,98 and we have personal knowledge of major
hospital systems that have paid for such services from medical liability
insurers.
Examples of how medical liability insurers advertise loss prevention
inspection services to their members include:
• Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company (MLMIC) pro-
vides policyholders with “on-site risk management surveys/
audits.”99
• ProAssurance provides “a confidential on-site risk assessment to
help identify opportunities for improvement.”100
• Illinois State Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange (ISMIE) pro-
vides “every policyholder the opportunity to undergo an on-site
assessment of their medical professional liability risks” with
“personalized feedback and recommendations to help address
any potential issues.”101
• CHART Risk Retention Group offers members “onsite and on-
line assessment surveys.”102
97. See Interview with senior medical liability insurance industry professional who has filled
multiple roles (Dec. 21, 2017) (notes on file with authors).
98. MLMIC Risk Protect, MLMIC, https://www.mlmic.com/physicians/mlmic-risk-protect/
(last visited Nov. 7, 2018).
99. Id.
100. Medical Practice Site Survey, PROASSURANCE, https://www.proassurance.com/managing-
risk/physicians-and-physician-groups/medical-practice-site-survey1/ (last visited June 11, 2018).
101. ISMIE, RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES: FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH CARE
PROFESSIONALS 6 (2018–2019), https://www.ismie.com/Risk-Management/Risk_Management_
Services_2018-2019/.
102. Services: Risk Management, CHART RISK RETENTION GROUP, https://www.chartrrg
.com/insurance/#tab-1-2 (last visited Feb. 13, 2019).
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• The Doctors Company offers members the ability to “request a
comprehensive on-site survey by [one of its] patient safety/risk
management experts.”103
• Medical Mutual Group encourages members to request an “on-
site risk assessment,” which is followed by “[s]pecific recommen-
dations . . . outlined in a report.”104
• MMIC provides policyholders with “customized on-site assess-
ments [to] help identify areas of risk, and create actionable
plans.”105
• Norcal Group offers policyholders “onsite risk management
services.”106
E. Liability Insurers Educate Medical Providers About Legal
Oversight and Risk Management
Many medical malpractice insurers provide educational services to
medical practitioners, one of the most common services being free
courses on topics related to medical liability that meet state Continu-
ing Medical Education (CME) requirements. Forty-six states have
CME requirements, and we have gathered that free, insurer-provided
courses are available in all of them.107 As well, many insurers offer
premium discounts as an incentive for participation in loss prevention
programs.108 Medical malpractice insurers also provide educational
materials for physicians through their websites, such as resource docu-
103. Interactive Guides/Site Surveys: Evaluate Your Practice and Systems, DOCTORS CO.,
https://www.thedoctors.com/patient-safety/Interactive-Guides-Site-Surveys-Evaluate-Your-Prac
tice-and-Systems/ (last visited May 31, 2018).
104. On-Site Risk Assessment, MED. MUTUAL, https://www.medicalmutualgroup.com/cra (last
visited May 31, 2018).
105. Assessments, MMIC, https://www.mmicgroup.com/insurance/minimize-risk/assessments
(last visited May 31, 2018).
106. Risk Management Solutions, NORCAL GROUP, https://www.norcal-group.com/risk (last
visited May 29, 2018).
107. See State CME Requirements, MEDSCAPE, https://www.medscape.org/public/staterequire
ments (last updated Apr. 2016). The four states that, according to this source, do not have CME
requirements are Colorado, Indiana, Montana, and New York. Id. For examples of insurer-of-
fered CME courses, see W. Stancil Starnes, Providing Resources and Support for Physicians, 110
WIS. MED. J. 254, 254 (2011); CRICO, CME: By Harvard Physicians. For Harvard Physicians.,
HARVARD, https://www.rmf.harvard.edu/CME-Home (last visited June 11, 2018); Continuing
Medical Education (CME), TEX. MED. LIABILITY TR., http://www.tmlt.org/cme (last visited June
11, 2018); Education and CME, DOCTORS CO., https://www.thedoctors.com/patient-safety/educa
tion-and-cme/ (last visited June 11, 2018).
108. See, e.g., Starnes, supra note 107, at 255 (encouraging “physicians who are insured by
ProAssurance . . . to earn up to 2.5% premium credit by taking advantage of [its] online loss
prevention seminar program”).
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ments, checklists, sample forms, and podcasts.109 Some offer a help-
line that policyholders may call to receive specialized advice and
consultation.110
As well as courses, seminars, and online materials, some medical
malpractice insurers now offer simulation-based training and team-
work training to policyholders.111 CRICO seems to be at the forefront
of this new risk management strategy,112 demonstrating that “there
should be an active partnership between the malpractice carrier and
the health care organization.”113 CRICO “has developed premium in-
centive plans that have incorporated simulation-based training and/or
teamwork training” in three specialty areas: anesthesiology, obstetrics,
and laparoscopic surgery.114 CRICO has also been involved in devel-
oping a “standardized multi-institutional operating room team train-
ing program using simulation” designed to practice teamwork,
communication skills, assertiveness, and the use of the World Health
Organization Surgical Safety Checklist.115 In order to incentivize par-
ticipation in its simulation training, CRICO offered premium dis-
counts, CME credits, and compensation for lost wages.116 Overall, the
pilot test of this training system showed that this form of training is
not only feasible, but can have a positive impact on its participants.117
Medical malpractice insurers are specially situated to develop and
provide these forms of safety training. Insurers and providers have a
shared mission to improve patient safety and avoid preventable inju-
ries, even if insurers are motivated by the less than altruistic goal of
avoiding financial exposure.118 However, because providers often
109. See, e.g., Keeping You Informed, MIEC, http://www.miec.com/RESOURCES/PUBLICA
TIONS.aspx (last visited June 11, 2018); MedPro Solutions Risk Consulting Services, MEDPRO,
https://www.medpro.com/risk-management-consulting-services (last visited June 11, 2018); see
also Starnes, supra note 107, at 255; Risk Management Solutions, supra note 106; Welcome to the
Learning Center, MAGMUTUAL, https://www.magmutual.com/learning-center (last visited May
29, 2018).
110. See, e.g., Starnes, supra note 107, at 255; Risk Management Solutions, supra note 107.
111. See Member Benefits, CHART RISK RETENTION GROUP, https://www.chartrrg.com/insur
ance/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2018).
112. Other medical malpractice insurers have also begun developing simulation trainings. See
e.g., id. (offering members “[o]n-request access to maternal, pediatric, infant, and central line
simulators”).
113. Robert Hanscom, Medical Simulation from an Insurer’s Perspective, 15 ACAD. EMER-
GENCY MED. 984, 986 (2008).
114. Id.
115. Alexander F. Arriaga et al., Pilot Testing of a Model for Insurer-Driven, Large-Scale
Multicenter Simulation Training for Operating Room Teams, 259 ANNALS SURGERY 403, 404, 408
(2014).
116. Id. at 403.
117. Id. at 405.
118. Hanscom, supra note 113, at 985.
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have competing priorities and lack the requisite resources to create
harm prevention programs, medical malpractice insurers are in a bet-
ter position to fill in the gaps and develop patient safety programs.119
“Because malpractice cases can be directly linked to dollars . . . [mal-
practice entities] can draw attention to cases—and causative factors—
that result in the ‘worst of the worst’ patient care disasters.”120
CRICO also produces short films and podcasts that depict, for exam-
ple, the impact medical errors have on patients and the psychological
consequences that physicians and nurses suffer after mistreating
them.121
Although the most common way that insurers try to lessen provid-
ers’ liability is through educational resources about improving safety
and lessening risk, many insurers also try to help providers reduce the
cost of adverse medical events by encouraging disclosure. One of the
key groups behind the disclosure movement, The Sorry Works! Coali-
tion (Sorry Works!), “is dedicated to promoting full disclosure and
apologies for medical errors as a ‘middle-ground solution’ in the medi-
cal liability crisis.”122 Some of the key members of Sorry Works! are
insurers.123 For example, Robert Kellogg, who is currently the Presi-
dent and CEO of Mesa Medical Insurance and who formerly served as
both the COO of New Mexico Mutual and President/CEO of State
Mutual Insurance Company in Michigan, is on the board of directors
for Sorry Works!124 The full-disclosure movement promulgated by
groups like Sorry Works! aims to improve doctor-patient relation-
ships, repair the reputation of providers, reduce litigation, and lessen
costs.125 “Qualitative research studies have identified . . . [that
p]atients who feel ignored, deserted, or who suspect that there is a
‘cover up’ by the medical profession, may be more inclined to sue.”126
This full-disclosure program has been utilized by the University of
Michigan Health System, which “halved the number of pending law-
119. Id. at 985–86.
120. Id. at 986.
121. See, e.g., CRICO Podcasts Home, HARVARD, https://www.rmf.harvard.edu/Clinician-Re
sources/Podcast/2011/CRICO-Podcasts-Home-Page (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (providing a list
of podcast episodes on medical malpractice case studies and patient safety updates).
122. Doug Wojcieszak, John Banja, & Carole Houk, The Sorry Works! Coalition: Making the
Case for Full Disclosure, 32 JOINT COMM’N J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 344, 344 (2006).
123. Id.
124. Board of Directors, SORRY WORKS!, https://sorryworks.net/board-of-directors/ (last vis-
ited May 29, 2018).
125. See Wojcieszak, Banja, & Houk, supra note 122, at 345–46.
126. Frank V. Lefevre, Teresa M. Waters, & Peter P. Budetti, A Survey of Physician Training
Programs in Risk Management and Communication Skills for Malpractice Prevention, 28 J.L.,
MED. & ETHICS 258, 265 (2000).
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suits and reduced litigation costs per case from $65,000 to $35,000,
resulting in annual savings of approximately $2 million in defense liti-
gation bills.”127 COPIC Insurance Company has also had success with
this program and has “reduced the number of lawsuits by half and
reduced settlement expenses by 25%.”128 The Veterans Affairs Medi-
cal Center in Lexington, Kentucky has benefited from full-disclosure
too.129 By “honestly notif[ying] patients of substandard care and of-
fer[ing] timely, comprehensive help in filing claims . . . [the facility]
diminishes the anger and desire for revenge that often motivates pa-
tients’ litigation,” leaving patients more willing to settle a claim “on
the basis of calculable monetary losses rather than on the potential for
large judgments that contain a punitive element.”130
We cannot assess the impact these educational programs and risk
management strategies have on physicians’ behavior. However, these
programs and strategies provide one more way for medical liability
insurers to reinforce both (1) legal oversight of physician behavior,
especially when a serious injury occurs, and (2) steps that physicians
and other providers can take to avoid, or at least reduce, liability.
F. Liability Insurers Support Patient Safety Organizations
Finally, medical liability insurers provide human capital and finan-
cial support to patient safety organizations. In 2005, as a response to
the Institute of Medicine report, To Err is Human, Congress enacted
the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, which set the
groundwork for the development of government-certified Patient
Safety Organizations (PSOs).131 Providers that work with a federally-
listed PSO are entitled to privilege and confidentiality protections
under the Act.132 “By conferring [these] privilege[s] . . . the Act was
intended to promote shared learning to enhance quality and safety
nationally.”133 In order to be considered a federally-listed PSO, an or-
ganization must be listed with the Agency for Healthcare Research
127. Wojcieszak, Banja, & Houk, supra note 122, at 346.
128. Id.
129. See Steve S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May Be the
Best Policy, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 963, 963–67 (1999).
130. Id. at 966.
131. See About the PSO Program, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, https:/
/www.pso.ahrq.gov/about (last visited June 1, 2018).
132. Id.
133. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-2\DPL206.txt unknown Seq: 27 27-MAR-19 12:19
2019] LIABILITY INSURERS 235
and Quality (AHRQ), a division of the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS).134
Current medical malpractice insurance personnel are often on the
boards of federally-listed Patient Safety Organizations, including the
Kentucky Institute for Patient Safety and Quality and the Ohio Pa-
tient Safety Institute.135 Some former staff members for medical mal-
practice insurance companies end up working at federally-listed PSOs
too, such as Clarity PSO.136 One organization, the CHART Institute,
has even combined a PSO and a medical malpractice insurance com-
pany into one.137 “CHART combines an AHRQ-certified Patient
Safety Organization with a 100% member-owned medical malpractice
insurance company.”138 Also, although currently delisted due to vol-
untary relinquishment of its federal PSO status, MagMutual Insurance
had its own PSO, the MagMutual Patient Safety Institute, between
2014 and 2017.139
Many current and former medical malpractice insurance personnel
are also on the boards of leading non-federally-listed patient safety
groups, including the American Society for Healthcare Risk Manage-
ment, the Schwartz Center for Compassionate Healthcare, the Alli-
ance for Quality Improvement and Patient Safety, the National
Patient Safety Foundation, the Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation,
Californians Allied for Patient Safety Protection, and the Leapfrog
Group.140
134. See Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,732, 70,732 (Nov. 21, 2008)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 3).
135. The Senior Vice President and COO of KHA Solutions Group, Brian Brezosky, is on the
board of KIPSQ. See Board Members, KY. INST. FOR PATIENT SAFETY & QUALITY, http://www
.kipsq.org/AboutKIPSQ/KIPSQBoard.aspx (last visited June 1, 2018); KY. HOSP. ASS’N, https://
www.kyha.com/kha-staff (last visited June 1, 2018). Jade Thompson, a Clinical Risk Consultant
at Coverys, is on the board of OPSI. See Board of Trustees, OHIO HOSP. ASS’N, https://www.ohio
hospitals.org/Patient-Safety-Quality/Ohio-Patient-Safety-Institute-OPSI/Board-of-Trustees.aspx
(last visited June 1, 2018).
136. Anne Marie Hajek, the President and CEO of Clarity Group, formerly served as both
the President of the Healthcare Risk Services Group and the Executive Vice President of MMI
Companies. See Who We Are, CLARITY PSO, http://www.claritygrp.com/patient-safety-organiza
tion/who-we-are (last visited June 1, 2018).
137. About, CHART RISK RETENTION GROUP, https://www.chartrrg.com/about/ (last visited
June 1, 2018).
138. Id.
139. See Delisted PSOs, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, https://www.pso
.ahrq.gov/listed/delisted (last visited June 1, 2018).
140. The American Society for Healthcare Risk Management (an affiliated society of the
American Hospital Association) has a number of people who work in medical liability insurance
on its board. See Board, AM. SOC’Y HEALTH CARE RISK MGMT., http://www.ashrm.org/about/
Board/bios.dhtml (last visited June 11, 2018). As well, the Risk Authority Stanford CEO, Jeff
Driver, is a Distinguished Fellow of the American Society for Healthcare Risk Management and
was also a past president. See Jeff Driver, JD, ARM, DFASHRM, MBA, RISK AUTHORITY, http:/
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We understand that medical malpractice insurers and individuals
employed by medical malpractice insurers also make financial contri-
butions to these organizations.141 In addition, some medical malprac-
tice insurers have grant programs that provide funding for patient
safety initiatives.142
/theriskauthority.com/organizer/jeff-driver-jd-arm-dfashrm-mba/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019). The
President of CRICO, Mark Reynolds, is on the board of The Schwartz Center for Compassion-
ate Healthcare. See Leadership, SCHWARTZ CTR. COMPASSIONATE HEALTHCARE, http://www
.theschwartzcenter.org/about-us/leadership/ (last visited June 11, 2018). The CRICO Chief Medi-
cal Officer, Luke Sato, is on the board of the Alliance for Quality Improvement and Patient
Safety. See Board of Directors, ALLIANCE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT & PATIENT SAFETY, https://
www.aqips.org/board-members (last visited Feb. 13, 2019); CRICO, Executive Leadership,
HARVARD, https://www.rmf.harvard.edu/About-CRICO/Our-Team/Departments/Executive-
Leadership (last visited June 11, 2018). The Doctors Company CEO, Richard E. Anderson, is on
the Board of Governors of the National Patient Safety Foundation and the Board of Directors of
Californians Allied for Patient Protection. See Company Overview of The Doctors Company,
BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=7405504
&privcapId=4222976&previousCapId=46274739&previousTitle=National%20Patient%20Safety
%20Foundation (last visited June 11, 2018). Many other medical malpractice insurance execu-
tives are on the Board of Directors of Californians Allied for Patient Health, including The
Norcal Group CEO, Scott Diener; one of the Assistant Vice Presidents at The Doctors Com-
pany, Elizabeth Healy; and CEO of the Physicians Reimbursement Fund, Stephen Scheifele. See
Californians Allied for Patient Prot., Board Members, MICRA, http://micra.org/about-capp/
board-members/ (last visited June 11, 2018). Preferred Physicians Medical Risk Retention Group
is on the corporate advisory council of the Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation. See 2019 Cor-
porate Advisory Council, ANESTHESIA PATIENT SAFETY FOUND., https://www.apsf.org/donors-
corporate.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2019). Dolores Mitchell, the former Executive Director of the
Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission is on the Board of Directors of the Leapfrog
Group. See Board of Directors, LEAPFROG GROUP, http://www.leapfroggroup.org/about/board-
directors (last visited June 11, 2018).
141. Coverys donates to the IHI Patient Safety & Quality Coalition. See IHI Patient Safety &
Quality Coalition: Coalition Member Roster, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, https://npsf
.site-ym.com/?page=coalitionmembers (last visited June 11, 2018); IHI Patient Safety & Quality
Coalition, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, http://www.npsf.org/?page=safetycoalition
(last visited June 11, 2018). Preferred Physicians Medical Risk Retention Group donated $30,000
last year to the Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation. See Corporate and Community Donors,
ANESTHESIA PATIENT SAFETY FOUND., https://www.apsf.org/donors.php (last visited June 11,
2018). The Doctors Company Foundation is a major supporter of the Institute for Healthcare
Improvement. See IHI Open School: Supporters, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, http://
www.ihi.org/education/IHIOpenSchool/overview/Pages/Supporters.aspx (last visited June 11,
2018).
142. Coverys donated to eighteen patient safety initiatives in 2016. See Press Release,
Coverys, Eighteen Patient Safety Hospital Programs Receive Funding in 2016 (Mar. 6, 2017),
https://www.coverys.com/About-Us/Media-Room/Press-Release/2017/March/Eighteen-Patient-
Safety-Hospital-Programs-Receive. CRICO has a grant program to fund patient safety initiatives
at member institutions. See CRICO, Grant RFD Details, HARVARD, https://www.rmf.harvard
.edu/Products-and-Services/Patient-Safety-Initiatives/CRICO-Grants/Grants-RFA-Details (last
visited June 11, 2018). NORCAL Group recently created the NORCAL Group Foundation
which provides grants for patient care, patient safety, and physician wellness. See NORCAL
Group Foundation Established to Support Healthcare Programs in Local Communities,
GLOBENEWSWIRE (Sept. 22, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/09/
22/1131545/0/en/NORCAL-Group-Foundation-Established-to-Support-Healthcare-Programs-in-
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CONCLUSION
When discussing the history of liability insurance in the United
States, Gary Schwartz noted the existence of a controversy concerning
the extent to which insurance coverage would discourage potential
tortfeasors from taking appropriate safety-enhancing steps.143 He
wrote that “many scholars share in the view that tort law’s deterrence
objective is ‘severely, perhaps fatally undermined’ by the prevalence
of insurance” because insurance breaks the connection between liabil-
ity and financial responsibility.144
We now know that the matter is not that simple. Because they bear
financial responsibility for losses, liability carriers use a variety of
techniques to encourage health care providers to exercise reasonable
care. They tie premiums to providers’ loss histories, accumulate data
that can be used to identify the root causes of medical mistakes, con-
duct loss prevention assessments of providers’ facilities, develop prac-
tice guidelines, teach providers how to deliver quality care more
consistently, and support patient safety research and initiatives. Lia-
bility insurers also help identify subpar providers by refusing to insure
them and by settling malpractice claims only when there is solid evi-
dence of negligence. Because carriers aggregate losses incurred by
populations of physicians, their loss-prevention incentives are larger
than individual providers’ incentives, as are their economies of scale in
research and deployment. The combination of incentives and scale
economies may lead insurers to develop better safety-enhancing mea-
sures than individual providers would on their own.
In practical effect, the incentives that insurers create and the moni-
toring services they deploy may preserve the deterrent effect of tort
law by replacing (or more than replacing) the loss of provider-level
financial responsibility for individual mistakes. Whether liability insur-
ance discourages providers from improving safety—as many scholars
once feared—or encourages them to protect patients from avoidable
harms—as may also be true—is an empirical question that a survey
paper like this one cannot resolve. But we have shown that insurers
make serious efforts to reduce their losses by encouraging and helping
providers to do better.
Local-Communities.html. The Risk Authority/SUMIT Stanford also has a grant program. See
SUMIT Insurance Company, Ltd., RISK AUTHORITY, http://theriskauthority.com/sumit/ (last vis-
ited June 11, 2018).
143. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 COR-
NELL L. REV. 313, 313 (1990).
144. Id. at 313 (quoting John G. Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA.
L. REV. 815, 823 (1967)).
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